The Right to Counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by unknown
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE
SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
Doughty v. Sacks
175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963)
The defendant, an indigent, was indicted for raping an eight-year old
girl. After being found sane he pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. His motion for leave to appeal was denied by the court of
appeals.1 Thereafter, he sought to invoke the original habeas corpus
jurisdiction of the Ohio Supreme Court, alleging, among other grounds,
that his constitutional right to counsel had been denied.2 In a per curiam
opinion that court held that not only had the defendant failed to ask that
counsel be appointed but that by pleading guilty he had waived his right
to counsel.3 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in
a per curiam opinion vacated the judgment and "remanded for further
consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright," 4 wherein it was held
that the sLxth amendment's requirement of counsel is made mandatory on
the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 Upon
remand the Ohio Supreme Court adhered to its earlier decision. The
court apparently assumed that Gideon has retrospective effect and that
the right to counsel attached to the pleading stage of the criminal proceed-
ing. However the court distinguished Gideon from Doughty on the ground
that Gideon had asked for counsel whereas Doughty had not, and, on that
basis alone, denied relief. On a second appeal the United States Supreme
Court again reversed per curiam. 6
The United States Supreme Court has long been troubled by right
to counsel and whether or not it is an absolute and unqualified right. In
Powell v. Alabama,7 the first case dealing with the right to appointed
counsel, the Supreme Court held that counsel must be appointed if the
defendant is an indigent accused of a capital offense and incapable of
1 State v. Doughty, No. 6452, Franklin County Court of Appeals, May 17, 1960.
2 Brief for Appellant, pp. 1-5, Doughty v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E2d
368 (1962). The defendant also claimed he was beaten by the police, forced to
confess, denied a trial by jury, and denied the right to meet his accusers face to face.
3 Doughty v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d 368 (1962).
4 Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781 (1963).
r Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6 Doughty v. Sacks, 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963), rev'd sub norn.,
Doughty v. Maxwell, 84 Sup. Ct. 702 (1964). In reversing, the Supreme Court relied
on Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) and Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 5.
In Carnley the indigent defendant was tried for a non-capital offense. The United
States Supreme Court reversed his conviction because counsel had not been either
offered to, or intelligently waived by the defendant. The Court said that "presuming
waiver from a silent record is impermissible."
7287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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adequately defending himself. In the subsequent case of Betts v. Brady 8 the
defendant was indicted for a non-capital felony. At the arraignment his
request for court appointed counsel was denied because it was the state
court's practice to appoint counsel only in murder and rape prosecutions.
He then pleaded not guilty and conducted his own defense. Following
his conviction and a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, reasoning that the four-
teenth amendment did not make the sixth amendment applicable to the
states. In a state trial, counsel need be present only where an "appraisal
of the totality of facts in a given case" clearly shows a denial of fundamental
fairness induced by counsel's absence.9 And on the facts of this case, the
court concluded that such a denial did not exist. Then in 1963, the
Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright10 which was factually
similar to Betts v. Brady. In Gideon, the petitioner was charged with the
felony of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor.
He appeared before the court without counsel and his request for appoint-
ment of counsel by the court was denied. After attempting to conduct his
own defense, he was convicted and sentenced to five years in the state
penitentiary. Gideon's subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied by the Florida Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion pre-
sumably relying on Betts v. Brady.-' The United States Supreme Court,
in overruling Bets and reversing Gideon, pointed out that at the time Betts
was decided, numerous precedents supported the conclusion that the ap-
pointment of counsel was essential to a fair trial. 12 The court then expressly
8 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
9 Id. at 462.
10 Supra note 5.
11 Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961).
12 372 U.S. 335, 344: "The right of one charged with crime to counsel may
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trial in some countries but it is
in ours."
The surprising aspect of Gideon is that the mandate was so long in coming.
For a prelude, see Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) ; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
672 (1948); William v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Tinkle v. United States, 254
F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1958).
See generally Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1957) ; Holtzoff, "The Right of Counsel
Under the Sixth Amendment," 20 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 (1944); Fellman, The Defend-
ant's Rights 112-127 (1958).
Gideon is noted in 2 De Paul L. Rev. 306, 307-08 (1963) in these terms:
One can surmise that the main import of Gideon v. Wainwright will be to
the effect of expanding the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to include the fundamental propriety of the right to counsel.
Therefore the fourteenth amendment now guarantees to the defendants in
state criminal proceedings the identical and fundamental justice of the right
to counsel which the sixth amendment has always guaranteed in federal
prosecutions and in neither case will there be a distinction made between
capital and non-capital offenses.
Gideon is also noted in 37 St. John's L. Rev. 358 (1963) and 49 A.B.A.J. 587 (1963).
For a prediction of this outcome see Kamisar, "The Right to Counsel and the
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held that the sixth amendment's requirement of appointment of counsel
is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, and is
therefore applicable to proceedings in state courts.13
In Gideon, the court emphasized that procedural safeguards must be
taken to assure all defendants equal treatment before the courts. Thus
a giant step forward has been taken toward equalization of defendant's
rights; yet with this advancement has come more than the usual number
of ancillary problems.
As stated by Mr. Justice Clark, "The sixty-four dollar question is at
what point in the procedure is an indigent entitled to the assignment of
counsel?" 14 At the trial, the right to counsel appears to be a settled
question and clearly attaches as an absolute right.15 At the appellate level,
right to appointment of counsel was at one time held to be within the
court's discretion and not an absolute, unqualified right.16 However, in
1963 the Supreme Court in Douglas v. California17 held that where an
indigent has only one appeal as of right, the state must provide him with
the assistance of counsel.' 8 The court expressly left open the question of
whether counsel is required for the preparation of a petition for dis-
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue of the Most Pervasive Right of an Accused,"
30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1962). For the historical background of right to counsel
culminating in the overruling of Betts v. Brady, see Angell, "The Burial of Betts v.
Brady," 18 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 265 (1963).
13 The sixth amendment's requirement of assistance of counsel had previously
been interpreted to include the right to court-appointed counsel. Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640 (1948).
'4 Clark, "The Sixth Amendment and The Law of the Land," 81 St. Louis U.L.J.
1, 10 (1963).
1"; Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 433 (1961) ; In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330
(1957). In Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1942), the court said, "the
duty upon a court of according an accused his constitutional right to assistance of
counsel is positive and affirmative and must not be ignored." See Annot., 2 L. Ed.
2d 1644 (1957); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 980-982(2) (1961); 24 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 1574 (1961).
The right has not been recognized in the following circumstances on the belief
that there was no "trial": Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959) (secret in-
vestigation) ; Begalke v. United States, 286 F.2d 606 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (police interro-
gation) ; Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
631 (1942) (grand jury witness) ; Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Calif.
1945) (armed forces criminal prosecution) ; People v. Coker, 104 Cal. App. 2d 224,
231 P2d 81, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951) (coroner's inquest) ; State v. Andrews,
187 Kan. 458, 357 P2d 739, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868 (1961) (lunacy inquisition) ;
Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959) cert. denied, 361 U.S.
882 (1960) (sanity commission hearing).
10 See Bandy v. United States, 272 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1959); Armstrong v.
Bannan, 272 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 925 (1960) ; California
v. Logan, 137 Cal. App. 2d 331, 290 P.2d 11 (1955) ; People v. Pitts, 6 N.Y.2d 288,
160 N.E.2d 523, 189 N.Y.S2d 650 (1959). See Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1957).
17 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Is Id. at 357.
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cretionary or mandatory review beyond the first appeal. On the same
day the Supreme Court also decided Lane v. Brown.19 Here the defendant
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The Public Defender
represented him on an unsuccessful appeal and also at a hearing on a
writ of error coram nobis. The Public Defender refused to appeal from
the denial of the writ. The United States Supreme Court in reversing
said a state cannot deprive an indigent of appellate review solely because
of his poverty. This case appears to extend the requirement of appointed
counsel for indigents on appeal, but exactly how far appointed counsel
need pursue further relief is not yet clear.
The judicial delineation of the right to counsel at the pretrial stages
is far from complete. One who is merely "picked up," arrested, and in-
terrogated does not have an absolute right to counsel, 20 but the absence
of counsel will be a factor in determining whether a confession was
properly and voluntarily given. 21
At the preliminary hearing or examination there is a qualified but
not an absolute right to counsel. In White v. Maryland,22 the defendant,
without counsel at his preliminary hearing, pleaded guilty. At the later
arraignment, he was represented by counsel and he pleaded not guilty.
However, his original guilty plea was admitted into evidence at the trial,23
and he was convicted. In reversing the conviction, the Court held that in
this instance the preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" 24 in the trial
and that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause required repre-
sentation by counsel. The Court approved the following language of
Hamilton v. Alabama: 25 "Only the presence of counsel could have enabled
this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead in-
19 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
20 See Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) ; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958) ; Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962) ; State v. Andrews,
supra note 15; Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949) ; Commonwealth
ex rel Johnson v. Meyers, 194 Pa. Super. 452, 169 A.2d 319, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
960 (1961). But see Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964). See generally
Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge (1962);
F-outs, From Arrest to Release (1958).
21 See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) ; Lee v. United States,
322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963). See Beaney, "Right to Counsel Before Arraignment,"
45 Minn. L. Rev. 771 (1961).
22 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
23 Under Ohio law a guilty plea taken at the preliminary examination may also
be introduced as evidence at the trial. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2937 (Page 1953).
24 What is a critical stage is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Clark,
supra note 14, at 10-11. In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) the court said
the arraignment was a critical stage because there the defense of insanity and other
objections either had to be raised or they were lost. In White v. Maryland, supra
note 22, the Court said that the preliminary hearing under Maryland law was as
critical a stage as the arraignment under Alabama law, and that a taking of a plea
in the absence of counsel violates due process requirements.
25 Supra note 24.
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telligently." 2 The proposition that there must be a showing of prejudice
for a reversal was explicitly rejected. Although the case involved a
capital offense, the language of the opinion implies that in any serious non-
capital offense, the Court will reach the same result.27 Nance v. United
States 28 illustrates what may happen when counsel is not granted at the
preliminary hearing. There the accused asked a witness: "How do you
know it was me, when I had a handkerchief over my face?" This was
held to have been properly admitted into evidence as an admission.
After the indictment, but prior to the arraignment, there may be no
absolute right but the absence of counsel will be a strong factor in judging
what took place, even to the point of excluding voluntary confessions. 29
The decision in Lee v. United States3o extended this protection further.
After being indicted for selling heroin, Lee was secretly questioned in his
cell while without counsel. The Government agents then testified to his
oral admissions. The Court in reversing Lee's conviction said that "the
constitution gives a defendant the absolute right to counsel starting no
later than after the indictment." 31
If the defendant at the arraignment, and in the absence of counsel
pleads not guilty, and there is not even a suggestion that the absence of
counsel was harmful, it appears that the court will not reverse a con-
viction for lack of counsel. 32 But if there were even a trace of harm
resulting from counsel's absence the court might well reach the conclusion
that counsel was necessary and accordingly reverse. That trace of harm
might be the waiver of a defense or objection that is required to be raised
at the arraignment. It could be the waiver of a defense such as insanity,
or the failure to object to the introduction of evidence. However, if the
defendant in the absence of counsel pleads guilty the procedure becomes
20 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55.
27 The situation is clearly analogous to the early distinction that was made be-
tween capital and non-capital offenses and right to counsel at the trial. This dis-
tinction was soon removed. Now that the right to counsel has been extended to the
arraignment for capital offenses where the court considers the arraignment to be a
critical stage, the logical extension is to take the next step and grant the right to
defendants charged at the arraignment with serious non-capital offenses.
28 299 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
29 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). While the court excluded the
confession, it refused to say whether there was an absolute right to counsel at this
point.
30 Supra note 21.
31 Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 778. The breadth and inclusiveness of the
holding in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), is still amenable to
question. Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion at its broadest held that the sixth amendment
required exclusion of evidence "which federal agents had deliberately elicited from
[defendant] after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel," but elements
of unfair surprise present in Massiah and absent in cases like Lee might reasonably
lead to different results in the run of cases.
32 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). But see Mr. Justice Black's con-
curring opinion at 518-19. See also Hamilton v. Alabama, supra note 26; Gallagos
v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) ; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
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more in doubt and the chances of a reversal of a conviction greater. Surely
the presence of counsel at the arraignment may be as important as having
counsel at the trial.33 The decisions made at this stage determine the course
of the criminal prosecution. Decisions which may result in an unfounded
conviction should not be made by a bewildered defendant but should be left
to the expert judgment of an attorney. One hypothetical case illustrates
the importance of an attorney. If a defendant is charged with rape, counsel
may know that the victim was known to be unchaste, or that she made
no fresh complaint, or that there was an illegal search, or that the con-
fession was obtained by force, or that, although the prosecutor could prove
a lesser offense, he could not prove the offense charged. Counsel in this
situation could either negotiate a guilty plea for a lesser penalty or advise
a plea of not guilty. Doughty in the instant case was imprisoned for life
at hard labor after his guilty plea at the arraignment ended the criminal
proceedings. Representation by counsel seems at least as critical in the
instant case as in White where the plea was only used as evidence at
the trial.
Once it is determined that a constitutional right exists, may that right
be waived? The constitutional right 3 4 to a speedy and public trial, the
right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront adverse witnesses may all
be waived.3 5 It has also been held that the right to counsel may be
waived.3 6 However, the waiver of right to counsel must be made knowingly
and intelligently; 37 it must be made with knowledge of the right and it will
33 In Downing, "Criminal Procedure-Right to Counsel Prior to Trial," 44 Ky.
L.J. 103 (1955) the author argues at 103 that:
If at any time from the time of his arrest to final determination of his guilt
or innocence, an accused really needs the help of an attorney it is the pre-
trial period. Even if the defendant has committed some crime, he may not
be guilty of the crime with which he had been charged, and in ignorance of
the law he may on arraignment, even plead guilty to a more serious offense
than he has actually committed.
34 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
35 Speedy Trial: United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 880 (1958) ; Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D. C. Cir. 1956) (court
recognized the rule but held the defendant did not waive his right by failing to ask
for it when he was not aware of that right); Campodonico v. United States, 222
F.2d 310 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955). Public trial: United States
v. Kobli, 172 F2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949). Trial by Jury: Aeby v. United States, 255
F2d 847 (5th Cir. 1958); Leonard v. United States, 231 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1956).
Confrontation of Adverse Witnesses: Cruzado v. Puerto Rico, 210 F.2d 789 (1st Cir.
1954).
36 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Cuff v. United States, 311 F.2d
185 (5th Cir. 1962); Devine v. Hand, 287 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1961); McDonald v.
Hudspecth, 108 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1940). See also Fellman, The Defendant's
Rights 119-21 (1958).
37 Carnley v. Cochran, supra note 32; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) ;
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1947) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ;
Fee v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Va. 1962) ; Arellanes v. United States,
302 F.2d (9th Cir. 1962) ; Aiken v. United States, 296 F2d 604 (4th Cir. 1961).
[Vol. 25
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
never be presumed or implied.38  A failure to inform an accused of his
right to counsel, 39 and if an indigent, of his right to court-appointed
counsel, has been held to preclude an intelligent waiver of that right where
the defendant does not know that the right exists. 40 A plea of guilty by
itself does not waive the constitutional right to counsel or court-appointed
counsel if the defendant is an indigent.41 An Ohio court has held that a
failure to inform an indigent defendant of his constitutional right to counsel
before he enters a guilty plea violates the fourteenth amendment.42 How-
ever, in the instant case, the Ohio Supreme Court on the first remand
adhered to its prior decision and tersely dismissed stating that "the facts in
the Gideon case are completely different from those in the present case," 43
thereby impliedly holding that when the defendant entered a guilty plea he
was presumed to have waived his right to counsel. 44 The Ohio court has
38 In Patton v. North Carolina, 315 F2d 643 (4th Cir. 1963), the court relied
on Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), when it said that courts indulge in every
reasonable presumption against waiver of right to counsel. The court further stated
that an effective waiver of counsel cannot be implied. See also Carnley v. Cochran,
supra note 32, and Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
39 In Pennsylvania ex rel Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 122 (1956) the court
said:
Moreover the number and complexity of the charges against petitioner, as well
as their seriousness, create a strong conviction that no layman could have
understood the accusations and that petitioner should, therefore, have been
advised of his right to be represented by counsel.
See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1949); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 979(2) (1961). The
Ohio decisions of In re Motz, 100 Ohio App. 296, 136 N.E.2d 430 (1955), and State
v. Cartwright, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 226, 161 N.E.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1957), seem to impose
the duty on the magistrate before whom an accused is brought for preliminary hear-
ing to inform the accused of his right to counsel.
40 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949) ; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437
(1948) ; United States v. Nickerson, 124 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1954). See Beaney,
The Right to Counsel 94-109 (1955).
41 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Commonwealth v. Kadio, 179 Pa. 196,
115 A2d 777 (1955). See Annot., 149 A.L.R. 1403-16 (1944) ; Beaney, The Right to
Counsel 64-66 (1955).
42 Ohio v. Porcaro, 102 Ohio App. 128, 141 N.E.2d 482 (1956). Here the
defendant was charged with burglary and grand larceny. The court seems to have
anticipated the Gideon decision when it stated in syllabus 4:
Where the defendant has been indicted for a felony, and upon arraignment
he enters a plea of guilty without the benefit of counsel, and before the de-
fendant has entered such plea the trial court has not advised him of his
constitutional rights, the accused is not accorded due process under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution.
Id. at 128-9, 141 N.E.2d at 484. See also In re Motz, supra note 39; State v. Stewart,
38 Ohio L. Abs. 543, 50 N.E2d 910 (Ct. App. 1943). In Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1003,
1042 (1949), Brooks v. State, 17 Ohio App. 510 (1923), is cited in these terms:
"the effect of this decision . . . is that it is made obligatory upon the trial court to
initiate inquiry into the accused's ability to employ counsel and to inform him of his
right to have counsel appointed."
43 Supra note 6, at 46, 191 N.E2d at 728.
44 Supra note 3.
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consistently held that a guilty plea raises a presumption of waiver of the
right to have counsel appointed, 45 a presumption that has yet to be over-
come in any case before it,4 6 despite the fact that one who intends to plead
guilty may be in greater need of counsel than one who does not so intend.47
The defendant, Doughty, was a semi-skilled, indigent laborer with a
fourth grade education. He alleged that he was not specifically informed
of the crime to which he was pleading, of the severity of the punishment,
or of his right to counsel.48 On these facts it is difficult to argue that there
was a known and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.
The Ohio Supreme Court distinguished Doughty from Gideon on the
sole point that "in Gideon the accused specifically asked that counsel be
appointed to represent him, which request was denied," whereas in Doughty
the accused "never made any request to the court that counsel be appointed
to represent him." 49 The court is seemingly distinguishing between active
and passive denial of counsel; nevertheless, it would seem that where an
uneducated indigent is not informed by the court of his federal and state
constitutional 50 and statutory 51 right to counsel, he should not be deemed
to have waived that right through his own ignorance.
52
45 In re Levenson, 154 Ohio St. 278, 96 N.E2d 760 (1950); In re Burson,
152 Ohio St. 375, 89 N.E.2d 651 (1949). This presumption apparently arose in the
Burson case. There the court made it clear that the trial court erred when it did
not inform the defendant of his right to counsel. However after looking at the
record, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the trial court could, on the facts
presented, presume the defendant knew he had no defense. The court also relied
on Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), saying that that case does not require that
all defendants have the assistance of counsel in all cases and that under the circum-
stances presented counsel was not required. This reasoning should now be recon-
sidered and rejected in the light of the overruling of Betts v. Brady by Gideon.
46 The burden of proof has been shifted to the defendant to prove he was harmed
by the denial of counsel. Research has failed to disclose any case in which this
presumption has been overcome.
47 In Kamisar, supra note 12, at 63, the author argues that "the defense attorney
afforded access to the prosecutor's files can much more intelligently weigh the likeli-
hood of conviction against the results he can achieve by a guilty plea. How well
informed is the uncounselled indigent when he makes his decision to plead guilty
or stand trial ?"
48 Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, pp. 1-5.
49 Supra note 6, at 47, 191 N.E.2d at 728.
50 The relevant constitutional provisions are: U.S. Const. amend. VI; U.S.
Const. amend. XIV; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10.
51 The relevant statutory provisions are: Fed. R. Crim. P. 44; Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2941.50 (Page 1953) A clearer and more concise statute appears in Cal. Pen.
Code § 987:
If the defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, he must be in-
formed by the court that it is his right to have counsel before being ar-
raigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires
and is unable to employ counsel, the courts must assign counsel to defend him.
52 See cases cited note 37 supra. In State v. Cartwright, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 226,
228, 161 N.E.2d 456, 457 (Ct. App. 1957) the court stated:
[E]ven in a case where guilt may seem apparent, it is the positive duty of
the court to explain carefully to the accused all his legal and constitutional
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Another ground used by the Ohio Supreme Court to deny relief in
its first decision was that habeas corpus was an improper remedy because
the court below had jurisdiction and the writ of habeas corpus may be
allowed only where there is a lack of jurisdiction.53 The length of this
note allows but a brief comment on this significant subject. It would seem
that federal precedents will control the right to counsel cases arising in
state courts. 4 However, that question has not yet been explicitly decided.
The Supreme Court of the United States has uniformly held that granting
the right to counsel is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court, that
a decision is void if that right is denied,5 5 and that the proper method of
attacking such a judgment is by a writ of habeas corpus.56 When the
Ohio Supreme Court defines jurisdiction in criminal cases by mechanical
standards so effectively denying important constitutionally protected rights,
it errs in its duty to preserve those rights. 7 The court should be especially
rights, including especially his right to representation by counsel both before
arraignment and at all subsequent stages of the case, to inquire as to de-
fendant's wishes with respect to counsel and, if so requested, and if he finds
defendant indigent, to appoint counsel for him.
53 Chapter 2725 of the Ohio Revised Code governs the granting of writs of habeas
corpus. Section 2725.02 provides that the writ may be issued by the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, Court of Common Pleas and the Probate Court. Note that not
only is the Supreme Court of Ohio, along with the lower courts, authorized to grant
writs of habeas corpus, but it is also given original jurisdiction in habeas corpus
proceedings by article IV, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution.
54 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). For a valuable discussion of this aspect
of Doughty see Note, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 596 (1964).
5 Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra note 37; Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 37;
Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States v. Morgan,
222 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1955).
56 In Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 37, at 468, the court said:
If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court
no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced
by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may
obtain release by habeas corpus.
See also Able v. Tinsley, 213 F. Supp. 784 (D. Colo. 1962) ; Devine v. Hand, supra
note 36; Annot., 146 A.L.R. 369 (1943); 25 Am. Jur. Habeas Corpus § 49 (1940);
Fellman, The Defendant's Rights 64-84 (1958).
57 Habeas corpus has been denied in the following decisions: Rodriguez v. Sacks,
173 Ohio St. 456, 184 N.E2d 93 (1962) (allegation of lack of competent counsel);
Boynton v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 526, 184 N.E.2d 337 (1962) (allegation defendant
was held incommunicado for twenty-two days); Norton v. Green, 173 Ohio St.
531, 184 N.E.2d 401 (1962) (allegation of improper indictment); Abney v. Sacks,
172 Ohio St. 401, 176 N.E.2d 223 (1961) (claim of incompetent counsel).
In the following cases the court has recognized the rule that denial of right of
counsel precludes a valid judgment, yet held that the facts did not warrant the rule's
application: In re Beard, 164 Ohio St. 488, 132 N.E.2d 96 (1956) ; It re Levenson,
supra note 45; In re Burson, supra note 45. The practical effect of these decisions
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responsible in cases similar to Doughty where the deprivation of the de-
fendant's liberties is so severe.
The consequences of reversal by the United States Supreme Court for
failure to appoint counsel to represent Doughty must be examined.5 s
When Gideon's writ was allowed by the Supreme Court, there was a
fantastic increase in the number of such writs filed in Florida. "Of the
8,000 prisoners in Florida penal institutions, 4,542 were convicted without
benefit of counsel. Already more than 3,000 have petitioned for review of
their conviction." 59 It should be obvious that the problem of judicial
administration is quite serious. It would be especially serious for the
Ohio Supreme Court because the state constitution states that the supreme
court shall have original jurisdiction of writs of habeas corpus.60 And
it is certain that regardless of how these writs reach the court the resulting
number of writs filed would preclude anything but a hasty evaluation of
their merits and would deter the court from its other important duties.
In fact, the court has been "literally flooded with such writs" (" since
Gideon and Doughty were considered by the Supreme Court. The court's
harsh attitude toward these writs and its overly strict interpretation of
"jurisdictional error" may have been in part motivated by a reluctance
to encourage the filing of prodigious numbers of writs. A constitutional
amendment to eliminate this direct procedure is imperative, since the court
should not be forced to the dilemma of either devoting a disproportionate
amount of time to habeas corpus writs or continuing dubious judicial
definitions to quell the onslaught. Economy of judicial administration is
a poor rationale for the abrogation of such a fundamental constitutional
right as right to counsel.
The Supreme Court of the United States has concluded that failure
to offer counsel in criminal prosecutions will result in such fundamental
unfairness and lack of justice as to be in and of itself, a violation of the
constitution:
is that there is no right to an original habeas corpus action in the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the overwhelming majority of cases. See Note, 21 Ohio St. L.. 684 (1960).
58 Petitioner's motion to the Supreme Court in the instant case asked that the
warden be ordered to discharge him from custody. His freedom may be short lived
since he may be tried again without being subjected to double jeopardy. Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Wiman v. Powell, 293 F2d 605 (5th Cir. 1961).
59 Time, Oct. 18, 1963, p. 53.
60 Ohio Const. art. IV, § 2.
61 Harold S. Shelton, Deputy-Clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court, told the writer
on November 22, 1963 that there had been a "substantial increase in the number of
habeas corpus writs filed in the Ohio Supreme Court this year as compared to the
past. We have been literally flooded with such writs."
It is interesting to note that from March 18, 1963 (the date of the Supreme
Court's decision in Gideon) to November 22, 1963, there had been thirty-two habeas
corpus writs filed in the Ohio Supreme Court. During that same period of time
twenty-seven writs were filed in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County.
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[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our ad-
versary system of criminal justice, any person hailed into court
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth.62
If this language is to be literally applied, it would seem that in each and
every criminal case counsel would have to be provided if the defendant
were indigent and counsel was not properly waived. Such a result would
surely create much confusion since the majority of the states have refused
to appoint counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions. 63 A proper result would
be to make appointment of counsel necessary only in criminal prosecutions
deemed to be of "serious nature." 64
One possible solution for the similar predicaments of this and other
courts is to apply constitutional decisions only prospectively. The Supreme
Court has not yet expressly said whether Gideon is to be applied prospec-
tively or retrospectively. 65 A rationale for prospective overruling exists
for those cases initially correctly decided. One may argue that only because
of changed circumstances have they become invalid and that to reopen
them would be doing a great misdeed. But there has been a semblance
of a general rule that constitutional decisions are to be applied retro-
spectively except where such an application would result in hardship or
injustice. 66 Mr. Justice Clark has said that since we are dealing with a
62 Gideon v. Wainwright, mspra note 5, at 344.
63 See Simeone & Richardson, "The Indigent and His Right to Legal Assistance
in Criminal Cases," 81 St. Louis U.L.J. 15, 20 (1963).
64 "Serious nature" criminal cases appears to mean something more than a traffic
ticket yet less than a felony. Where the line will be drawn requires a case by case
analysis furthered by the application of common sense. Certainly the crime, the
applicable punishment, and the particular defendant are all factors to consider. In-
terpreting some cases to be "criminal prosecutions" and others not to be, however,
would seem to be a dubious solution to the problem.
Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942) has been the only federal case to
consider the right to counsel in a misdemeanor prosecution. The court in the non-
support action said at 638 that the constitution did not distinguish between serious
and minor offenses and the subsequent right to counsel.
However, the Supreme Court, in District of Columbia v. Clawens, 300 U.S. 617,
624-25 (1937), termed an offense punishable by 90 days imprisonment a petty offense
and one not entitled to a trial by jury.
65 The question merits full consideration and adequate exegesis by the court, but
will apparently be resolved in favor of retrospective application sub silentio. United
States v. LaValle, 330 F.2d 303, cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 1921 (1964).
66 See, e.g., Safarif v. Udall, 304 F2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Massaghlia v.
Commissioner, 286 F2d 258 (10th Cir. 1961). This general law has shown a rather
remarkable degree of variance in its application to the cases. An example would
be the turmoil that followed the Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), which overruled prior case law allowing the introduction into state
courts of illegally obtained information. Lower courts have split on whether the
opinion stood for both prospective and retrospective application or prospective applica-
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constitutional rule, it may well be that "the question would be governed
by our opinions holding that the right of an indigent to a sufficiently full
record of the proceedings is retrospective." 67 The proper solution to all
of this is surely the obvious: a straight-forward holding by the Supreme
Court on the question whether Gideon invalidated prior convictions wherein
an indigent defendant was denied court-appointed counsel. At least one
of the Justices believes the time is ripe for that decision.6 8
By restricting habeas corpus writs, by not requiring magistrates to
inquire whether defendants want, need, or can afford counsel, and by
allowing waiver of the right to counsel to be presumed, the Ohio Supreme
Court has abdicated its responsibility to protect constitutional rights.
tion alone. See Traynor, "Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States," 1962 Duke
L. J. 319, 338-42.
A. For prospective application only, see Hall v. Warden, 201 F. Supp. 639
(D. Md. 1962), rev'd 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963); Moore v. State, 41 Ala. App.
657, 146 So. 2d 734 (1962); People v. Miller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 N.E2d 99, 227
N.Y.S.2d 421 (1962). See also Bender, "The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling
Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio," 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 650 (1962).
B. For prospective and retrospective application, see Hurst v. California, 211
F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Calif. 1962). At 395 the court held that Mapp must be given
retroactive effect:
It would appear that the Supreme Court itself has at least intimated that
such is to be the result of any decision in which the court reverses the pre-
existing law on constitutional grounds. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955) ;
Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S.
214 (1958).
For the Supreme Court's reasoning, see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
in Griffith v. Illinois, supra, at 25-26.
C. For indecision see State v. Evans, 75 N.J. Super., 319, 324, 183 A2d 137,
140 (1962) :
While the application of Mapp is essentially prospective it is not necessarily
inapplicable merely because the search antedated [it]. . . its restrospective
effect, however, is circumscribed by potential limits and is subordinate to es-
sential justice both to the individual and to the community.
An unambiguous statement by the Supreme Court would prevent this from occurring.
See generally Snyder, "Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions," 35 Ill. L.
Rev. 121 (1941).
67 Clark, "The Sixth Amendment and The Law of the Land," supra note 14, at 9.
For support Justice Clark cites Ker v. California, supra note 54, and Nowell v. Illinois,
373 U.S. 420 (1963).
68 Mr. Justice Harlan in dissenting from the court's decision to remand Pickel-
simer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 3-4 (1963), for further consideration in light of
Gideon v. Wainwright said:
I am unable to agree with the Court's summary disposition of these 10
Florida cases, and believe that the federal question . . . whether the denial
of an indigent defendant's right to court-appointed counsel in a state criminal
trial as established last Term in Gideon v. Wainwright . . . invalidates his
pre-Gideon conviction [ought to be given full consideration].
In the current swift pace of constitutional change, the time has come for
this Court to deal definitively with this important and far-reaching subject.
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Injured defendants must thus resort to the federal court system where the
administrative problems are surely as great as in the state courts. The
Ohio Supreme Court could alleviate the problem by placing the burden of
protecting these rights on the trial courts of the state, where it properly
belongs.
From Powell v. Alabama to Gideon v. Wainwright, the doctrine of
right to counsel has been expounded and illuminated.6 9 Doughty was
clearly inconsistent with this mandate and was correctly reversed by the
United States Supreme Court, for as we have seen, "without the help of a
lawyer, all the other safeguards of a fair trial may be empty." 70
69 For a discussion of Powell through Betts and other similar cases, see 2
Ploscowe, Manual for Prosecuting Attorneys 622-28 (1956).
70 Brennan, "The Bill of Rights and the States," 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 761 (1961).
At pp. 773-74 Mr. Justice Brennan went on to say:
And it is not the due process clause that is alone involved here. The equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is also implicated. For a
state cannot, consistently with the Federal Constitution, deny a citizen ac-
cused of crime the right to the assistance of counsel if he cannot afford to
pay his own lawyer. The victims of the limitation upon the state's obliga-
tion to provide counsel are the indigent-they are the helpless, the weak, the
outnumbered in our society .... The denial of counsel to an indigent accused
seems almost to be an a fortiori case of the violation of the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws.
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